By Debalina Ghoshal

Missile deterrence traditionally refers to the possession of missile capabilities to prevent war. The threat of devastating retaliation is meant to alter an adversary’s psychological calculus, convincing them that an attack would result in unacceptable losses. However, in the modern security environment, missiles have increasingly become frontline combat weapons. This shift in utility undermines their traditional role as tools of restraint, raising a critical question: have missiles failed as deterrents?

FROM TERROR WEAPONS TO PRECISION COMBAT

The use of ballistic and cruise missiles in active warfare is not new. During World War II, Germany deployed V-1 cruise and V-2 ballistic missiles. In the 1980s, liquid-fueled Scud missiles were used extensively during the Iran-Iraq War to break civilian morale and disrupt economic activity. Historically, the poor accuracy of these systems meant they were relied upon primarily as blunt instruments of terror and regional dominance. Today, that paradigm has shifted. Advancements in missile technology have allowed both state and nonstate actors to achieve pinpoint accuracy. While improving accuracy is theoretically meant to strengthen deterrence, it simultaneously creates highly efficient, lethal weapons capable of executing decapitation strikes against an adversary’s retaliatory forces. Modern warfare has redefined Deterrence has evolved into a multi-phased escalation ladder. The primary goal remains preventing war entirely. If that fails, the secondary goal is deterring an all-out conventional war. Should conventional war break out, the final phase of deterrence focuses on preventing the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).

THE COMBAT REALITY OF CONVENTIONAL MISSILES

Technological advancements have transformed conventional missiles into weapons designed not necessarily to prevent war, but to fight and win it. Capable of inflicting proportionate or overwhelming damage, conventionally armed missiles are increasingly used to wage high-intensity conflicts. This is evident in recent warfare trends, including the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War, “Op Sindoor” in 2025, and the Iran-Israel conflicts of 2025 and 2026.

During World War II, Germany deployed V-1 cruise and V-2 ballistic missiles. In the 1980s, liquid-fueled Scud missiles were used extensively during the Iran-Iraq War to break civilian morale and disrupt economic activity. Historically, the poor accuracy of these systems meant they were relied upon primarily as blunt instruments of terror and regional dominance. Today, that paradigm has shifted. Advancements in missile technology have allowed both state and nonstate actors to achieve pinpoint accuracy. While improving accuracy is theoretically meant to strengthen deterrence, it simultaneously creates highly efficient, lethal weapons capable of executing decapitation strikes against an adversary’s retaliatory forces. Modern warfare has redefined deterrence into a multi-phased escalation ladder.

Ultimately, a missile is merely a delivery system; its strategic value is dictated by its payload. Missiles armed with WMDs carry immense deterrent value. However, when missiles are armed with conventional warheads meant for immediate combat, the delivery system itself becomes a combat weapon. In these scenarios, missiles are deployed precisely because deterrence has already failed. While conventional missiles are often touted as deterrents, they are generally only effective at preventing nuclear escalation, not conventional skirmishes. In fact, conventional missiles can paradoxically lower the threshold for conflict. States may view them as ideal tools for launching low-scale, highly controlled strikes that advance their strategic agendas while remaining just below the threshold of nuclear war.

REVISIONISM AND DETERRENCE JEOPARDY

Deterrence is fundamentally a psychological game. A state can only deter an adversary if it successfully influences that adversary’s perception of risk. Iran, for example, views its ballistic and cruise missiles as vital for conventional deterrence a primary reason Tehran refused to include them in past nuclear negotiations. Yet, should deterrence fail, Iran is fully prepared to use these systems as offensive weapons.

This psychological dynamic breaks down entirely when dealing with revisionist states. States determined to violently alter the status quo are rarely deterred by conventional missiles. If they are confident in their ability to inflict lethal damage, they are often willing to absorb retaliatory strikes. This dynamic is clearly visible in the recent Iran-Israel conflicts, where Iran has been willing to strike Israel, U.S. forward bases, and allied host nations despite the risk of retaliation. This creates a state of “deterrence jeopardy”—a scenario in which missiles fail to maintain peace and are instead actively fired, risking rapid escalation.

THE COMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDED DETERRENCE

The calculus becomes even more complex when missiles are used to guarantee the security of allied nations. France, for example, relies heavily on sea-based deterrence, including submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and carrier-based aircraft. Recently, France has expressed a desire to extend its nuclear security umbrella to European Union (EU) states. Against the backdrop of Russian aggression, this extended missile deterrence introduces profound psychological and strategic dilemmas, as threat perceptions vary wildly among different EU nations.

Conclusion

Threat perception is a mind game, and deterrence relies entirely on winning it. Today, missiles serve as the ultimate stand-off weapons, allowing states to strike targets while keeping their launch platforms like submarines and aircraft safely outside the zone of destruction. While states may publicly frame their missile arsenals as tools of deterrence, that label only applies as long as peace holds in the minds of their adversaries. Once that psychological barrier breaks, missiles instantly transition from weapons of peace to instruments of war.

Debalina Ghoshal is an advisor for Indian Aerospace and Defence News and the author of the book Role of Ballistic and Cruise Missiles in International Security.