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In a world increasingly fractured by conflict, the burden of preventing war often feels like a task reserved for high-level diplomats and heads of state. Yet, on a quiet digital call bridging kitchens to home offices, several Project Save the World members, known as the Preventing War Inquiry, gathered for the final session of their five-week study to tackle this very mandate. Led by facilitator Jill Carr-Harris, this citizens’ inquiry embarked on a meticulous review of international legal mechanisms, assessing how the global community can better respond to mass atrocities, specifically focusing on the devastating and often overlooked crisis in Sudan.
What unfolded was a masterclass in grassroots engagement with international law. The participants dissected complex frameworks such as the United Nations’ Uniting for Peace resolution, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, the proposed United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS), and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Through their debate, a clear narrative emerged: the current international security architecture is deeply flawed, paralyzed by political interests, and in desperate need of reform.
The backdrop to the group’s deliberations was the ongoing civil war in Sudan, which erupted in April 2023. The conflict, largely ignored by mainstream global media compared to the crises in Gaza or Ukraine, has resulted in catastrophic humanitarian consequences.
The group focused heavily on the siege of Al-Fashir in Western Darfur, where the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) besieged the civilian population for 18 months.
Richard Denton, reading from the group’s briefing, outlined the grim reality: in late October 2023, a mass execution of non-Arab civilian populations by the RSF reportedly left upwards of 6,000 people dead in just three days. Despite the UN Human Rights Council dispatching a fact-finding mission that documented ethnically motivated killings, widespread sexual violence, and forced starvation—and concluded that genocide had occurred—the international community’s response was stifled.
Why? The answer lies in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). A resolution calling for a ceasefire and the implementation of protective measures was put forward but was ultimately blocked by Russia, one of the five permanent members (P5) holding veto power. This structural bottleneck—where a single nation can halt global humanitarian intervention to serve its geopolitical interests—was the primary target of the Preventing War Group’s reform recommendations.
To circumvent the deadlock of the Security Council, the group first examined the Uniting for Peace (U4P) mechanism. Introduced in 1950, U4P allows the UN General Assembly to take up a matter of international peace and security if the Security Council is paralyzed by a veto.
Rose Dyson read the proposed recommendation: if the Security Council is blocked, the General Assembly should use U4P to condemn the war, recommend targeted sanctions, and call for protective missions.
However, the group quickly recognized the limitations of this mechanism. Robin Collins, serving as the group’s resident expert on UN procedures, clarified a crucial distinction: the General Assembly cannot mandate or authorize the Security Council to act; it can only make recommendations.
“It cannot compel the Security Council to act on that,” Collins explained. “So they can recommend sanctions and R2P actions, but they cannot authorize or mandate.” Despite this lack of enforcement capability, the group agreed that Uniting for Peace (U4P) remains a vital tool for applying public and political pressure. As James Simeon pointed out, utilizing U4P forces member states to debate the issue openly, potentially embarrassing the deadlocked Security Council members on the world stage.
Recognizing the diplomatic weight of this tool, the group voted to pass the recommendation, amending the language from “authorize” to “recommend.”
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P) AND ARTICLE 51
The conversation then shifted to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a political commitment unanimously endorsed by all UN member states in 2005. R2P asserts that states have a responsibility to protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes including genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. If a state fails to do so, the international community has a responsibility to intervene.
However, as Rose Dyson and Jill Carr-Harris noted with frustration, R2P requires the approval of the Security Council. In the case of Sudan, where the regime itself or powerful warring factions are committing the atrocities, waiting for a unified Security Council is often a death sentence for civilians.
“This is the most horrendous killing of civilians,” Carr-Harris stated. “If we can’t do Responsibility to Protect here, it seems like this concept is just not working at all.”
Collins introduced an alternative legal avenue: Article 51 of the UN Charter. This article recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member state. If the Security Council is blocked, a state under attack (or factions representing the targeted civilian population) could appeal to other member states for collective self-defence. While acknowledging that this could escalate into broader war rather than peace, the group recognized it as a necessary bypass when the UN’s primary security apparatus fails.
Perhaps the most forward-looking portion of the meeting centered on how the international community physically and financially supports peacekeeping. The group discussed the concept of a United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS)—a proposed standing UN force.
Unlike traditional peacekeeping, which relies on borrowing troops from member states (a process that can take six months to mobilize, as Rose Dyson pointed out regarding Sudan), UNEPS would be a permanent, rapidly deployable force directly hired and paid by the UN. Collins reminisced about Canada’s historical role in the 1980s in advocating for a rapid reaction force, a legacy the group wished to revive.
But how to pay for it? In a world where nations are rapidly increasing their military budgets—with many heading toward allocating 2% to 5% of GDP for defence—the group proposed a radical yet logical shift.
James Simeon suggested that a specific portion of GDP be legally allocated to peacekeeping.
After some debate over exact figures versus nebulous terms such as “a substantial portion,” the group boldly settled on a concrete number: 1% of GDP.
“We want 1% for peacekeeping. I think that seems modest when they want to do [5% for the military],” Lyn argued.
Carr-Harris agreed, noting the symbolic and rallying power of calling themselves the “one percenters” for peace.
The resolution passed unanimously, with support from Nigerian member Lizzie Igbine, who voiced her approval from her kitchen while preparing for the next day’s farm work—a poignant reminder of the everyday citizens backing these global initiatives.
The final major mechanism discussed was the International Criminal Court (ICC). Richard Denton read the recommendation urging the ICC to enforce legal procedures for the arrest of political leaders threatening or practicing genocide.
The tragic irony in Sudan is that while the country signed the Rome Statute in 2000, it never ratified it. Nevertheless, the UN Security Council has referred the Darfur situation to the ICC in the past (Resolution 1593 in 2005), giving the court jurisdiction. Yet, as of the meeting, no case regarding the recent Al-Fashir massacres had been lodged.
James raised a vital question regarding the democratization of international justice: “Would it be possible for civil society groups to petition the prosecutor at the ICC to conduct investigations?”
Collins provided a sobering reality check. Technically, only three entities can trigger an ICC prosecution: a member state of the Rome Statute, the UN Security Council, or the ICC Prosecutor acting proprio motu (on their own initiative). Civil society cannot directly force the prosecutor’s hand.
However, the group concluded that civil society’s role is far from powerless. By organizing, documenting atrocities, and relentlessly lobbying their own governments (if their governments are parties to the Rome Statute), peace groups can create the political capital necessary for a state to formally request an ICC investigation.
As the session wound down, with Carr-Harris reminding the participants of an upcoming citizen inquiry on economics, the profound nature of the Preventing War Group’s work lingered.
Here were (mainly Canadian) citizens—retirees, activists, physicians, farmers, and scholars—refusing to accept the geopolitical status quo.
They waded through the “gobbledygook” of international law, confronted the devastating realities of the Sudanese civil war, and drafted actionable, reform-minded resolutions. They recognized that while mechanisms like Uniting for Peace, R2P, and the ICC are currently hobbled by the veto power of a few powerful nations, these tools can be sharpened.
Whether through advocating for a standing UN emergency force, demanding 1% of GDP for peace, or mobilizing civil society to pressure member states, the path to preventing war requires relentless, educated public pressure.
In a world overshadowed by the looming threat of conflict, the Preventing War Group serves as a vital reminder: peace is not merely the absence of war; it is a legally binding, fully funded, and democratically enforced responsibility.